In the standard real options approach to investment, the owner of the option decides when to exercise the investment option. However, in many real-world settings, investment decisions are delegated to managers. This article provides a model of optimal contracting in a continuous-time principal-agent setting in which there is both moral hazard and adverse selection. We show that the underlying option can be decomposed into two components: a manager's option and an owner's option. The specification of the manager's option is determined by a compensation contract, and must provide an incentive for the manager to both extend effort and to exercise optimally. The residual option payout goes to the owner. The implied investment behavior differs significantly from that of the first-best no-agency solution. In particular, there will be greater inertia in investment, as the model leads to the manager having an even greater "option to wait" than the owner. The interplay between the twin forces of hidden information and hidden action leads to markedly different investment outcomes than when only one of the two forces is at work. * We thank Harrison Hong, David Scharfstein, Jeff Zwiebel, and especially Erwan Morellec, for helpful comments.
Introduction
The real options framework has proven to be a powerful and flexible approach for analyzing investment under uncertainty. Essentially, the real options approach posits that the opportunity to invest in a project is analogous to an American call option on the investment project. Once that analogy is made, the vast and rigorous machinery of financial options theory is at the disposal of real investment analysis. Thus, the timing of investment is economically equivalent to the optimal exercise decision for an option. The real options approach is well summarized in Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Trigeorgis (1996) . 1 In the standard real options paradigm, there are no agency conflicts as it assumed that the option's owner makes the exercise decision. Thus, there is a stark assumption that there is no delegation of investment decisions from owners to managers, and hence no agency frictions that can impede the optimal timing of investment. A large economics literature extensively studies principal-agent conflicts. 2 In this paper, we extend the real options framework to the principal-agent setting, where the manager is delegated the decision as to when to invest. In this setting, managers can influence the quality of the underlying option through their efforts, and where the information about project quality is known only by the manager prior to investment. In the presence of both hidden action and hidden information, we formulate an optimal contract that provides an option value that is as close as possible to the first-best setting in which no such agency conflicts exist.
In order to highlight the importance of including principal-agent considerations into real options models, consider the following two examples of well-known applications.
Example 1: The US Government's Delegation of Offshore Oil Exploration to Private
Firms 1 The application of the real options approach to investment is quite broad. Brennan and Schwartz (1985) use an option pricing approach to analyze investment in natural resources. McDonald and Siegel (1986) provided the standard continuous-time framework for analysis of a firm's investment in a single project. Majd and Pindyck (1987) enrich the analysis with a time-to-build feature. Dixit (1989) uses the real option approach to examine entry and exit from a productive activity. Triantis and Hodder (1990) analyze manufacturing flexibility as an option. Titman (1985) and Williams (1991) use the real options approach to analyze real estate development.
2 See Mirrlees (1976) and Holmstrom (1979) , for early formal models on principal-agent relationship.
A prototypical case of a real option is oil exploration. Paddock, Siegel, and Smith (1988) model the option-like characteristics of offshore oil leases. Using an option analogy, the right to drill for oil represents an American call option on the market value of the oil reserves with an exercise price equal to the cost of extraction. In the case of offshore oil exploration, there exists a clear principal-agent problem in that the U.S.
government delegates (via auctions) the production rights to private firms. 3 Thus, the principal (government) must use a contract to motivate the agent (private oil firm) to exercise their option as efficiently as possible. 4 Clearly, both moral hazard and adverse selection problems may exist. The amount of research, effort and technology used by the firm are not easily observed, yet can have a material impact on the ultimate costs and efficiency of exploration. In addition, the amount and nature of the underlying oil deposits will be known with greater certainty by the firm than the government. The actual contract offered by the government entails that an annual royalty be paid based on value of extracted oil, along with a fixed annual fee.
Example 2: Agency and the Management of Commercial Real Estate
Another example of a real option is the leasing of vacant space. As presented in Grenadier (1995) , the leasing of space is analogous to an American call option where the underlying asset is the present value of lease cash flows and the exercise price equals the lump sum costs of leasing such as tenant improvement costs. In the U.S., corporations and institutional investors own approximately two thirds of nonresidential real estate (Institute of Real Estate Management, 1991). 5 As pointed out by Williams (2001) , the agency problems associated with owning and managing certain types of commercial real estate can be severe. In particular, the leasing of vacant space in older, less-thanpristine commercial buildings is prone to moral hazard and adverse selection problems.
Leasing costs such as finding tenants (or monitoring a leasing agent), negotiating with tenants, and fixing up space to suit new tenants are often private, and not easily verifiable or contractible. The owner of the building must provide an incentive for the 3 See Hendricks, Porter and Boudreau (1987) and Hendricks and Kovenock (1989) for more details about such offshore oil leases.
4 While other objectives may be possible, we assume that the government's objective is to achieve the greatest value from the potential oil deposit. 5 Miles and Tolleson (1997) provide a conservative estimate of the value of U.S. commercial real estate of $4 trillion, as of 1997.
manager to supply the appropriate amount of effort in order to make payoff from leasing to new tenants as close to the first-best level as possible. A compensation contract must be constructed that is based on the observable value of the rent achieved by the manager. For example, leasing agents (delegated the role of finding new tenants) are typically paid a percentage of the rent obtained, with leasing bonuses and reputation effects adding some non-linear compensation features. In addition, property managers (delegated the role of maintaining a property) are compensated in a similar manner.
In the model, an owner delegates the option exercise decision to a manager. Thus, the timing of investment is determined by the manager. The true quality of the project can be high or low. However, through effort, the manager can influence the likelihood that the quality of the project is high. This unobserved effort represents the hidden action component of the model. In addition, while the manager learns the true quality of the project after the effort decision is made, this information is not revealed to the owner. This represents the hidden information component of the model. A compensation contract must be contingent on the observable realized value of the project upon exercise. This contract must provide two types of incentives to the manager: an incentive to extend effort and an incentive to exercise as close as possible to the value-maximizing stopping time. Importantly, we show that the underlying option can be decomposed into two components: a "manager's option" and an "owner's option."
The manager's option has a payout upon exercise that is a function of the compensation contract. Based on this contractual payout, the manager determines the exercise time.
The owner's option has a payout, received at the manager's chosen exercise time, equal to the payoff from the underlying option minus the manager's compensation. The model provides the solution for the optimal compensation contract that comes as close as possible to the first-best no-agency solution.
The model implies investment behavior substantially different from that of the standard real options approach with no agency problems. In general, managers will display greater inertia in their investment behavior, as they will invest later than implied by the first-best solution. In essence, this is a result of the manager (even in an optimal contract) not having a full ownership stake in the option payoff. This less than full ownership interest implies that the manager has a greater "option to wait" than the owner. Such investment delay due to incentive problems is consistent with the results in Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000) , where they look at the compensation and investment behavior of manufacturing firms following the passage of anti-takeover legislation. Presumably, following such legislation, managers become more entrenched and the divergence of interests between owners and managers becomes more pronounced.
They find that managers display more inertia in their investment policy following the anti-takeover legislation. This is consistent with our model, and not as consistent with the view that less disciplined managers behave like empire builders.
An important aspect of the model is the interaction of hidden action and hidden information. In fact, we find that the nature of the optimal contract depends explicitly on the relative importance of these two forces. While we focus on the most interesting case in which both forces play a role in the optimal contract, it is instructive to consider two extremes. If the cost-benefit ratio of effort (a measure of the strength of the hidden effort component) is very low, then the hidden action component disappears from the optimal contract terms. Thus, if the nature of the underlying option is such that inducing effort is sufficiently inexpensive, then we are left with a simple problem of hidden information, and the contract will simply reward the manager with informational rent. This is the setting of Maeland (2002) , which considers a real options setting with only hidden information about the costs of investment. Conversely, if the cost-benefit ratio of effort is very high, then the hidden action component dominates the optimal contract. The cost of inducing effort is so high as to no longer necessitate the payment of informational rents.
It is only when both forces are in effect that the optimal compensation contract must trade off the relative costs and benefits of inducing effort and information revelation.
Interestingly, the interplay between hidden information and hidden action may actually improve the efficiency in investment timing decision. This is because the compensation that is needed to induce effort provides the manager with a greater ownership stake in the underlying option, making the manager's timing incentives closer to those of the first-best. Bernardo, Cai and Luo (2001) analyze capital budgeting and compensation in an investment context with moral hazard and adverse selection. However, their focus in on the amount of investment rather than the timing of investment.
In a later section, we generalize the model to allow for managers to display greater impatience than owners. For example, managers may have a shorter horizon (due to job loss, death, etc.), or may appear to use a higher discount rate due to being less diversified or liquidity constrained. This generalization leads to very different predictions about investment timing. While the basic model predicts that investment will occur later than the first-best case, in this generalized setting investment can actually occur earlier than the first-best case. The intuition is that the marginal benefit to the manager of receiving compensation at an earlier point in time is less than the marginal cost to the owner.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the setup of the model and derives the simplified optimization program. Section 3 solves for the optimal contracts in three separate regions. In Section 4 we analyze the implications on investment lags and the erosion of the option value due to the agency problem. Section 5 shows that both under-and over-investment problems may arise, when the manager and the owner have different degrees of impatience. Section 6 concludes. Appendices contain the solution details of the optimal contracts.
Model
In this section, we begin with a description of the model. We then, as a useful benchmark, provide the solution to the first-best no-agency investment problem. Finally, we present and simplify the full principal-agent optimization problem faced by the owner.
Setup
The principal owns an option to invest in a single project. Let the value P (t) of the underlying project evolve as a geometric Brownian motion:
where α is the instantaneous conditional expected percentage change in P (t) per unit time, σ is the instantaneous conditional standard deviation per unit time, and dZ is the increment of a standard Wiener process.
We assume that the principal (owner) delegates the exercise decision to an agent (manager). This desire to delegate investment authority is premised on the fact that it is more costly for the owner to exercise the option than it is for the manager, perhaps due to the manager's possessing some specialized skill, or to a higher opportunity cost for the owner. Both the owner and the manager are risk neutral, 6 with the risk-free rate of interest denoted by r. For convergence, we assume that r > α. The value of the project, P (t), is observable to both the owner and manager at all times. Let P equal the current value of the project, P = P (0).
The exercise cost may take on two possible values: θ 1 or θ 2 , with θ 1 < θ 2 , determined randomly. One may interpret a draw of θ 1 as a "higher quality" project and a draw of θ 2 as a "lower quality" project. However, the manager may affect the likelihood of drawing θ 1 by exerting a one-time effort, at time 0. If the manager exerts no effort (or a low amount of effort with a normalized cost of zero), the probability of drawing a low exercise cost θ 1 equals q L . However, if the manager exerts effort, he incurs a cost ξ > 0 at time 0, but increases the likelihood of drawing a low exercise cost θ 1 from q L to q H . Immediately after his exerting effort, the manager observes his realized exercise cost, and knows if the project is of higher or lower quality.
The owner does not observe the realized exercise cost, but observes and can contract on the trigger level at which the manager exercises the option (the value of the project upon investment). The manager is paid immediately after he exercises the option.
The manager is always free to walk away and not exercise the option. That is, he has limited liability, whether his exercise cost is low or high.
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In summary, the owner faces a problem with both hidden information (the owner does not observe the true realization of θ) and hidden action (the owner cannot verify the manager's effort level). Before analyzing the optimal contracting, we first briefly review the first-best no-agency solution that is used as the benchmark. 6 We rule out the time-0 selling-the-firm contract between the owner and the manager. This may be justified if the manager is liquidity constrained and cannot, for example, borrow from a bank. 7 The limited-liability condition is essential in delivering the investment inefficiency result in this context. Otherwise, with risk-neutrality assumptions for both the owner and the manager, and no limited liability, the first-best optimal investment timing may be achieved even in the presence of hidden information and hidden action [Innes (1990) ]. An alternative mechanism for generating investment inefficiency in an agency context is to assume risk aversion.
First-Best Benchmark (The Standard Real Options Case)
When the exercise cost θ is observed and contractible, then the first-best timing of investment may be made. Let W (P ; θ) denote the value of the owner's option, in a world where θ is a known parameter. Using standard arguments [i.e. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) ], W (P ; θ) must solve the following differential equation:
Differential equation (2.2) must be solved subject to appropriate boundary conditions. These boundary conditions serve to ensure that an optimal exercise strategy is chosen:
3)
Here, P * (θ) is the value of P (t) that triggers entry. The first boundary condition is the value-matching condition. It simply states that at the moment the option is exercised, the expected payoff is P * (θ) − θ. The second boundary condition is the smooth-pasting or high-contact condition. 8 This condition ensures that the exercise trigger is chosen so as to maximize the value of the option. The third boundary condition reflects the fact that zero is an absorbing barrier for P (t).
Closed-form solutions for W (P, θ) and the exercise trigger P * (θ) are easily obtained.
The value of the first-best option value and exercise trigger can be written as:
where
and
8 See Merton (1973) for a discussion of the high-contact condition.
Note that
Since the realized value of θ can be either θ 1 or θ 2 , we denote P * (θ 1 ) = P * 1 and P * (θ 2 ) = P * 2 . We shall always assume the current value of the project, P , is less than P * 1 . The ex-ante value of the owner's option under high effort and no agency is q H W (P ; θ 1 ) + (1 − q H )W (P ; θ 2 ). We can write this first-best option value, V * (P ), as:
It will prove useful in future calculations to define the present value of one dollar received at the first moment that triggerP is reached, for i = 1, 2. Denote this present value operator as D(P ;P ). This is simply the solution to differential equation (2.2) subject to the boundary conditions that D(P ;P ) = 1, and D(0;P ) = 0. The solution can be written as:
A Principal-Agent Setting
The owner offers the manager a contract at time zero. The contract specifies a payment made to the manager, paid at the time of exercise. The owner is committed to implementing the contract. The payment can be made contingent on the realized value of the project at the time of exercise. Thus, in principle, for any value of P received by the owner at the time of exercise, a contracted wage, w(P ), can be specified.
The principal-agent setting leads to a decomposition of the underlying option into two options: an owner's option and a manager's option. The owner's option has a payoff function of P − w(P ), and the manager's option has a payoff function of w(P ) − θ.
Obviously, the sum of these payoff functions equals the payoff of the underlying option.
The manager's option is of the tradition American call option variety, since the manager chooses the exercise time to maximize the value of his option. However, in this optimal contracting setting, it is the owner that ultimately controls the timing of exercise through the choice of contract parameters that induce the exercise policy that maximizes the value of its option. In addition, the manager also possesses a compound option, since the manager has the option to exert effort at time zero. The properties of the manager's option are thus contingent upon this initial effort choice.
Note that the problem has been framed as if the agent will pay the exercise cost of θ. However, it is observationally equivalent to have the owner to pay the exercise cost θ, if we redefine the net payment to the agent as s(P ) = w(P ) − θ. Then, the owner's payoff is P − s(P ) − θ and the manager's payoff is s(P ). Both formulations provide the same result. Throughout this paper, we will use the wage-value pair (w, P ) as the contracting instruments.
Since there are only two possible values of θ, for any w(P ) schedule, there can be at most two wage/value pairs that will be chosen by the manager. 9 Thus, the contract need only include two wage/value pairs from which the manager can choose: one that will be chosen by a manager with an exercise cost of θ 1 , and one chosen by a manager with an exercise cost of θ 2 . Therefore, the owner will offer a contract that promises a wage of w 1 if the option is exercised at P 1 and a wage of w 2 if the option is exercised at P 2 . The revelation principle will ensure that a manager with an exercise cost of θ 1
will exercise at the P 1 trigger, and a manager with an exercise cost of θ 2 will exercise at the P 2 trigger.
The owner's option has a payout function of
Thus, using function D( · ; · ) derived in (2.10), conditional on the manager exerting effort, the value of the owner's option, π o (P ; w 1 , w 2 , P 1 , P 2 ), can be written as:
The manager's option has a payout function of
Similarly, conditional on the manager exerting effort, the value of the manager's option, π m (P ; w 1 , w 2 , P 1 , P 2 ), can be written as:
For notational simplicity, we will sometimes drop the parameter arguments and simply write the owner's and manager's option values as π o (P ), and π m (P ), respectively.
The owner's objective is to maximize its option value through its choice of the contract terms w 1 , w 2 , P 1 , and P 2 . Thus, the owner solves the following optimization problem:
This optimization is subject to a variety of constraints induced by the hidden information and hidden action of the manager. The contract must induce the manager to accept the contract, exert effort, exercise at the trigger P 1 if θ = θ 1 , and exercise at the trigger P 2 if θ = θ 2 . It is the specification of these constraints to which we now turn.
There are both ex-ante and ex-post constraints involving the manager's option value, π m ( · ), derived in (2.12). The ex-ante constraints ensure that the manager exerts effort and that the contract is accepted. These are the traditional constraints in a static moral hazard setting.
• ex-ante incentive constraint:
The left side of this inequality is the value of the manager's option if effort is exerted minus the cost of effort. The right side is the value of the manager's option if no effort is exerted. This constraint ensures that the manager will exert effort.
• ex-ante participation constraint:
This constraint ensures that the total value to the manager of accepting the contract is non-negative.
The ex-post constraints ensure that the manager, in forming its optimal exercise policy, acts in accordance with the owner's beliefs. These are in keeping with the revelation principle, in that the θ 1 -manager will exercise at P 1 and the θ 2 -manager will exercise at P 2 .
• ex-post incentive constraints (IC):
The first inequality ensures that a manager with exercise cost θ 1 does indeed choose to exercise at the trigger P 1 . This is because the value of the payout at trigger P 1 is seen to be at least as great as the present value of the payout obtained by waiting until trigger P 2 is reached. 10 The second inequality ensures that a manager with exercise cost θ 2 does indeed choose to exercise at the trigger P 2 . This is because the value of the payout at trigger P 1 is seen to be less than or equal to the present value of the payout obtained by waiting until trigger P 2 is reached. Thus, these ex-post constraints ensure that the revelation principle holds.
• ex-post limited-liability constraints:
The manager is thus never forced to lose any money by participating in the deal, ex-ante
Therefore, the owner's problem has a total of six inequality constraints: the exante incentive and participation constraints, and each of the two ex-post incentive and limited-liability constraints. Fortunately, the following three Lemmas simplify the problem in that we can reduce the number of constraints to three.
Lemma 1. The limited-liability condition for type-θ 1 manager does not bind. That is,
where ∆θ = θ 2 − θ 1 > 0. The first and second inequality follow from (2.16) and (2.18) , respectively.
Re-arranging the IC constraint (2.14) gives In order to motivate the manager to exert high effort, we need to reward the manager with a surplus larger than zero, which is the manager's reservation value. This leads to the following result.
Lemma 2. The ex-ante participation constraint (2.15) does not bind.
Proof 2.
where the first inequality follows from ex-ante IC constraint (2.19) and the limited liability condition for type-θ 2 manager.
The following result states that there is no rent (not counting time-0 sunk effort cost) for the type-θ 2 manager.
Lemma 3. The limited liability for type-θ 2 manager binds, in that w
The intuition is straightforward. Giving type-θ 2 manager any positive rent expost implies a higher rent for type-θ 1 manager in order to meet the type-θ 1 manager's IC constraint. In order to minimize the rents subject to the manager's IR and IC constraints, the owner shall give type-θ 2 manager zero ex-post rent: w 2 = θ 2 . A formal proof of this Lemma appears in Appendix ??.
Together, Lemmas 1, 2, and 3 simplify the owner's optimization problem as follows: 20) subject to
At least one of (2.21) and (2.23) binds. Otherwise, reducing w 1 will increase the owner's value strictly, without violating constraint (2.22) . Based on which of these two constraints binds, the resulting contract will differ.
In the next section we explicitly solve this (now simplified) constrained optimization.
We will find that there exist three equilibrium solutions to the principal-agent problem, the particular solution depending on which of three disjoint regions a function of the initial parameters resides.
Model Solution: Optimal Contracts
In this section, we provide the solution to the optimal contracting problem described in the previous section: maximizing (2.20) subject to inequality constraints (2.21), (2.22) , and (2.23). We find that the nature of the solution depends on the initial parameter values. In particular, the solution depends explicitly on the magnitude of the cost-benefit ratio of the manager's effort. Depending on this magnitude, the optimal contract can take on three possible types: a "joint hidden information/ hidden action" type, a "pure hidden information" type, and a "pure hidden action" type.
We first define the three regions that determine the nature of the optimal contract.
The key to the contract is the magnitude of the ratio of costs to benefits of the manager's effort, defined by ξ/∆q. The numerator is the direct cost of extending effort, and the denominator is the change in the likelihood of achieving a low exercise cost due to effort. The regions are then defined by where this cost-benefit ratio falls relative to the present value of receiving a cash flow at three particular trigger values: 
We now define the three critical regions by whether the cost-benefit ratio of extending effort is medium, low or high.
1 The Joint Hidden-Information/Hidden-Action Region (medium cost-benefit ratio):
2 The Hidden-Information Region (low cost-benefit ratio):
The Hidden-Action Region (high cost-benefit ratio):
Note that another potential region in which ξ/∆q > D(P ; P * 1 )∆θ = ∆θ exists, however in this range the costs of effort are so high as to no longer justify the exertion of effort in equilibrium. Thus, we do not consider this region.
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We now describe the optimal contract in each of the three regions. Each contract is specified by two wage/trigger-value pairs: (w 1 , P 1 ), and (w 2 , P 2 ). The proofs detailing the solution are provided in Appendix A.
Joint Hidden Information/Hidden Action Region
In the parameter range defined by D(P ; K H )∆θ ≤ ξ/∆q ≤ D(P ; P * 2 )∆θ, the optimal contract can be written as:
27)
28)
Note that in this range, P 2 > P * 2 , and thus a θ 2 -type manager delays investment beyond the first-best full information trigger. In addition, while the θ 2 -type manager receives no net compensation (i.e., w 2 = θ 2 ), the θ 1 -type manager receives positive information rents (i.e., w 1 > θ 1 ).
Since the manager must be induced into providing effort, w 1 must be high enough to provide enough compensation for the ex-ante IC constraint (2.23) to bind. This reflects the "hidden action" component of the contract. In addition, given the surplus wage paid to the θ 1 -type manager, the exercise trigger P 2 must be high enough to dissuade the θ 1 -type manager from deviating from the equilibrium first-best trigger P * 1 . Thus, in this region P 2 is set so that the ex-post IC constraint (2.21) binds, ensuring that the revelation principle holds. This requires that P 2 be above the fullinformation trigger P * 2 . This deviation from the full-information trigger reflects the "hidden information" component of the contract.
We can use these contract terms to place a value on the owner's and manager's option values. The owner's and manager's option values, π o (P ) and π m (P ), respectively, can be written as:
The owner's option deviates from the first-best value, V * (P ) in (2.9), for two reasons.
First, the exercise trigger in the high exercise cost state is equal to K 2 rather than P * 2 ; this is seen in the second term of the expression for π o (P ). Second, the manager must be compensated for its effort through the wage paid in the low exercise cost state; this is evidenced in the third term of the expression for π o (P ). The manager's option value is simply equal to the present value of the surplus he receives should he be a θ 1 -type manager.
Hidden Information Only Region
In the parameter range, defined by ξ/∆q < D(P ; K H )∆θ, the optimal contract can be written as:
33)
34)
where we recall that
In this region, the net costs of effort are low enough so that there is no need for the firm to have to compensate the manager for extending effort. In this range, the ex-ante IC constraint does not bind, and therefore the cost of effort does not find its way into the optimal contract. 12 The compensation the θ 1 -type manager receives is purely an information rent that induces the manager to exercise at the first-best trigger P * 1 , in accordance with the revelation principle. Since w 1 no longer needs to be increased in order to induce effort (as in the joint region previously discussed), the P 2 trigger needs to be higher (relative to the first-best trigger P * 2 ) in order to dissuade the θ 1 -type manager from deviating from the equilibrium first-best trigger P * 1 . That is, in this region, P 2 is higher than it was in the joint region. Therefore, perhaps surprisingly, moral hazard serves to increase investment efficiency since the increased share of the firm that must go to compensate the manager leads the manager to more fully internalize the benefits of efficient investment timing.
It is interesting to note that the owner's option value is observationally equivalent to the first-best solution V * (P ) characterized in (2.7), when one substitutes the higher exercise cost ψ H for θ 2 . Thus, the impact of the costs of hidden information is fully embodied by an increase in the cost of exercise in the high exercise cost state. The manager's option value is simply equal to the surplus the θ 1 -type manager receives from the necessity of being induced into exercising at the first-best trigger P * 1 .
Hidden Action Only Region
In the parameter range, defined by D(P ; P * 2 )∆θ < ξ/∆q < D(P ; P * 1 )∆θ, the optimal contract can be written as:
(3.39)
40)
In this region, the contract triggers equal those of the first-best outcome. The moral hazard costs are so high that the rent needed for motivating high effort (via the ex-ante IC constraint) is sufficiently high so that the ex-post incentive constraints do not demand addition rents. That is, by motivating the manager to extend effort, w 1 ends up being high enough so that the θ 1 -type manager no longer needs P 2 to exceed P * 2 in order to dissuade him from deviating from the low-state trigger P * 1 . Thus, the contract is entirely driven by the need to motivate effort, as the ex-post IC constraints that reflect hidden information fail to bind.
The owner's option value is equal to the first-best solution V * (P ) characterized in (2.7), minus the present value of the rent paid to the manager in order to induce effort. The manager's option value is equal to the present value of this effort-inducing compensation.
An Observationally Equivalent Setting
In the first two regions discussed, investment in the high-cost state is delayed beyond the first-best trigger of P * 2 . It is only in the pure hidden-action region that the firstbest trigger is achieved. In order to enhance the reader's intuition, we provide an observationally equivalent model that gives the same delayed investment trigger (in the high cost state). The key point will be that increasing the costs of moral hazard mitigates the inefficiency induced by informational asymmetry, and therefore increases the efficiency of the investment timing decision.
Consider an alternative setting, without agency issues. However, suppose the owner only gets a fraction δ ≤ 1 of the total project P (t) at the time of exercise. For example, the owner may need to pay a fee proportional to the project's value. Therefore, his net payoff is δP (t) − θ 2 . Thus, the optimal trigger is simply P * 2 /δ. The owner delays his exercising timing, relative to the first-best (δ = 1), because the private marginal benefit is lower than the social marginal benefit.
The exercise in each of the three regions can be replicated through an appropriately chosen δ. In the joint hidden information/ hidden action region,
In the hidden information region,
In the hidden action region, there is no inefficiency in exercising the option, in that
It can be seen that increasing the costs of moral hazard lead to increased investment efficiency (although at a price of increased ex-ante effort compensation paid to the manager). As the costs of moral hazard move us from the hidden information region to the joint region, the percentage of the project retained by the firm increase, since δ j > δ i in this intermediate range. As the costs of moral hazard then move us into the hidden action region, the informational rents arising from the informational asymmetry is smaller than the limited-liability rents induced by the hidden action. Therefore, the owner may recommend the first-best investment timing decision to the manager and compensate him with enough limited-liability rents. The manager will no longer have an incentive to make costly delayed investment decision. This increase in the "ownership stake" in the high exercise cost state represents an equivalent representation of the timing efficiency induced by moral hazard costs. 
Model Implications
In this section, we analyze some of the more important implications of the optimal contracting model. First, a clear prediction of our model is that the principal-agent problem will introduce inertia in a firm's investment behavior. Investment projects are expected to be undertaken later than in the first-best setting. We thus consider the factors that influence the expected lag in investment due to the principal-agent problem. Second, specifically because the timing of investment differs from that of the first-best outcome, the principal-agent problem results in a welfare loss. Obviously, factors that make such welfare losses more pronounced will introduce an incentive for firms and industries to alter their structures to more closely align the interests of owners and managers.
In this section, we focus our analysis on the contract that prevails in the joint hidden information/ hidden action region. It is in this region that the incentive problems are the most rich and meaningful. 14 Recall from Section 3 that the optimal contract in 13 We are only considering increases in the costs of hidden action up to a point, equal to the right endpoint of the hidden action region. Increases in such costs beyond this point are not supported in equilibrium, since effort will no longer be extended.
14 In the hidden information region, exerting effort is worthwhile for the manager even without additional payment; effectively there is really no hidden action. In the hidden action region, there is no distortion in investment timing; hidden action and hidden information together do not lead to social welfare losses.
this joint region, D(P ; K H )∆θ ≤ ξ/∆q ≤ D(P ; P *
2 )∆θ, is:
48)
where the owner's and manager's option values, π o (P ) and π m (P ), respectively, can be written as:
Agency Problems and Investment Lags
In the principal-agent setting, investment will occur later than it does in the standard real options setting in which no principal-agent conflict is assumed to exist. Such investment delay due to incentive problems is consistent with the results in Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000) . In that paper, they look at the compensation and investment behavior of manufacturing firms following the passage of anti-takeover legislation.
Presumably, following such legislation, managers become more entrenched and the divergence of interests between owners and managers becomes more pronounced. They find that managers display more inertia in their investment policy following the antitakeover legislation. This is consistent with our model, and not as consistent with the view that less disciplined managers behave like empire builders. They also find that wages (including those for white collar workers) rise following the passage of the legislation, which is also consistent with the information rents paid in our model.
In the standard real options setting, investment is triggered at the value maximizing triggers, P * 1 and P * 2 , for the low and high exercise cost outcomes, respectively. However, in our setting, while the trigger for investment in the low exercise cost state remains at P * 1 , investment in the high exercise cost state may be triggered at K 2 , which is higher than the first-best benchmark level P * 2 .
Let T and T * be the stopping times at which the option is exercised, in our model and the first-best setting, respectively. We denote Γ = E (T − T * ) as the expected time lag due to the principal-agent problem. A solution for such an expectation can be derived using Harrison (1985, Chapter 3). The expected lag is given by
where we assume that α > σ 2 /2 in order for this expectation to exist.
An important insight from Section 3 is that increases in the cost-benefit ratio of effort leads to less distortion in investment timing. That is, as the ratio ξ/(∆q∆θ) increases, the equilibrium trigger P 2 becomes closer to the first-best trigger P * 2 . The intuition for this result is that as the incentive problems become more pronounced, the owner must compensate the manager with a greater fraction of the underlying project's cash flows. This greater ownership stake implies that the manager's exercise decision will be more closely aligned with that of the owner's. This intuition is confirmed by the following comparative statics:
Thus, increases in the cost of effort lead to a shorter expected investment lag, while increases in the benefits of effort lead to a longer expected investment lag.
An increase in the volatility of the underlying project, σ 2 , has an ambiguous effect on the expected time lag Γ. This can be seen from the following comparative static: An increase in the expected growth rate of the project, α, also has an ambiguous effect on the expected time lag Γ. This can be seen from the following comparative static: 
Welfare Loss and Option Values
Although the owner chooses the value-maximizing contract to provide an incentive for the manager to extend effort, the agency problem ultimately still proves costly. In an owner-managed firm, the manager will extend effort and will exercise the option at the first-best stopping times. However, in firms with delegated management, there will be a welfare loss due to the firm's suboptimal exercise strategy.
By a welfare loss, we are referring to the difference between the values of the firstbest option value, V * (P ) in (2.9), and the sum of the owner and manager options, π o (P ) and π m (P ) in (4.51) and (4.52). Thus, define the welfare loss due to agency issues as L, where
. Simplifying, we have:
This welfare loss is likely to have economic ramifications on the structure of firms.
For firms in industries with potentially large welfare losses due to agency, there will be powerful forces that will push them to be privately held, or to be organized in a manner that provides the closest alignment between owners and managers.
The size of the welfare loss is driven by the distance of the equilibrium trigger K 2 from the first-best trigger P * 2 . As previously discussed, the firm's exercise timing becomes less distorted as the net cost-benefit ratio of effort increases. That is, as the ratio ξ/( ∆q∆θ) increases, the equilibrium trigger K 2 gets closer to the first best trigger P * 2 , and thus:
In terms of the owner's option value, the incentive problem represents a trade-off between timing efficiency and the surplus that must be paid to the manager to extend effort. One can obtain better intuition on the forces at work in the agency problem through the following decomposition. In the first-best solution, the owner pays the cost of effort ξ and obtains the first-best option value V * (P ). In the agency equilibrium, the owner delegates the cost of effort to the manager, but then holds the sub-optimal option value π o (P ). The loss in the owner's option value due to the incentive problem is therefore given by:
where L is the total welfare loss given in (4.61), and V m is the ex-ante expected surplus paid to the manager to exert effort, and is given by:
The decomposition of the welfare cost to the owner from (4.65) into the sum of the timing component (L) and the compensation component (V m ), is very useful for providing intuition. The impact of a higher effort cost ξ represents a trade-off in terms of the timing and compensation components. As shown in (4.62), a higher effort cost results in more efficient investment timing. This must be traded-off against the increased surplus that must be paid to provide appropriate incentives to the manager, as seen in (4.66). Therefore, the total effect on the loss of owner's option value due to an increase in ξ depends on whether the "timing effect" or "compensation effect" is larger, in that
If the investment trigger K 2 is significantly larger than P * 2 , in that
then an increase in ξ leads to a smaller loss in the owner's option value, as the gain in timing efficiency overcomes the loss due to the manager's incentive surplus.
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Impatient Managers and Earlier-than-Optimal Investment
In the standard model, both owners and managers value payoffs identically. However, it may be the case that owners and managers have different discount rates. A manager very well may have a higher discount rate for the project's cash flows than the owner.
The manager's higher discount rate will be result in greater impatience; the manager will be more willing than the owner to take a reduced future payoff in exchange for receiving it earlier. The most interesting result of this generalization is that the manager may now invest earlier than the first-best optimum. Thus, while the standard model results in a form of under-investment, in the generalized model we can have both over and under-investment.
Consider the following potential motivations for a manager possessing a higher discount rate than the owner. For example, even if shocks to the underlying project's returns are solely idiosyncratic and uncorrelated with the market, an undiversified 15 Note that the above condition is non-empty. This can be seen as follows. Condition 4.69 is equivalent to
The joint moral hazard/hidden information region is characterized by P * 2 ≤ K 2 ≤ K H . Therefore, the above condition is met for some K 2 .
manager may discount project cash flows at a rate greater than the riskless rate. As another example, the manager may use a higher discount rate if his effective horizon is shorter. More specifically, suppose the manager faces an exogenous termination driven by a Poisson process with intensity λ, where termination may occur at any time prior to the realization of P 1 . This termination could be due to the manager's death, finding another job, or forced termination, but is not explicitly modeled. 16 The addition of stochastic termination transforms the manager's option to one in which his discount rate r is elevated to r + λ, a higher discount rate, to reflect the stochastic termination.
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In this section, we consider a setting where the manager and the owner have different discount rates. We suppose that the manager is more impatient than the owner.
Mathematically, this implies separate discount functions for the owner and manager, D o (P ;P ) and D m (P ;P ), where P ≤P :
Since ∂β/∂r > 0, the manager's higher discount rate is embodied by the condition
The problem is basically the same as that of Section 2.3, with the exception that the constraints all use the higher discount factor γ rather than β. In addition, much of the solution is similar. For example, Lemmas 1 and 2 apply as before, using the same proof. In addition, Lemma 3 also holds, and is demonstrated in the appendix.
Thus, the optimal contracting problem in the generalized setting can be written as: 16 We assume that the owner can costlessly replace the manager in the event of separation. 17 See Yaari (1965), Merton (1971) and Richard (1975) for this result.
subject to
Just as in Section 3, there are three contracting regions: a hidden information region, a joint hidden information-hidden action region, and a hidden action region.
In this section, we focus on the joint hidden information/hidden action region, as it provides the richest setting in which to analyze the model.
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The joint hidden information-hidden action region is defined by the following region: 25) . In this region the optimal contract can be written as:
77) 
Importantly, unlike the basic model, we now have the possibility of investment occurring before the first-best trigger, in that P 1 < P * 1 . To see this, note that H(0) = P * 1 and
The derivative of H( · ) is
Therefore, there exists a unique solution P 1 =K 1 < P * 1 . As in the standard model, the trigger in the high exercise state is greater than the first-best trigger, P * 2 . This is based on the fact thatK 2 > P * 2 in the region D m (P ;K H )∆θ < ξ/∆q < D m (P ; P * 2 )∆θ. However, for γ > β, the trigger is closer to the first-best trigger than for the standard case in which γ = β. This is true, since for
Thus, we have the result that in a model in which the manager is more impatient than the owner, equilibrium investment occurs sooner than it does in the standard model, with investment actually occurring prior to the first-best trigger in the low exercise cost state. The greater impatience on the part of the manager implies that it is in the owner's interest to offer a contract that motivates earlier exercise. This results in both costs and benefits to the owner. By motivating earlier investment in the highcost state, investment timing moves closer to first-best. Since the manager receives no surplus in this state, the owner is the sole beneficiary of this timing efficiency. However, earlier investment in the low-cost state implies investment that occurs sooner than the first-best outcome. In this state, the owner is worse off for two reasons: investment occurs too early, and the wage paid to the manager in this state must be higher (than in the standard model) in order to motivate early investment. The net effect of these costs and benefits is ambiguous and is driven by the relative parameter values.
Concluding Remarks
This paper extends the real options framework to account for the agency issues that are prevalent in many real-world applications. When investment decisions are delegated to managers, contracts must be designed that provide an incentive for the manager to both extend effort and to exercise optimally. This article provides a model of optimal contracting in a continuous-time principal-agent setting in which there is both moral hazard and adverse selection. The implied investment behavior differs significantly from that of the first-best no-agency solution. In particular, there will be greater inertia in investment, as the model leads to the manager having an even greater "option to wait" than the owner. The interplay between the twin forces of hidden information and hidden action leads to markedly different investment outcomes than when only one of the two forces is at work. Allowing the manager to have an effort choice that affects the likelihood of getting a high quality project mitigates the investment inefficiency due to informational asymmetry. When the model is generalized to include differing degrees of impatience between owners and managers, we find that investment may occur either earlier or later than optimal.
Some extensions of the model would prove interesting. First, the model could allow for repeated investment decisions. This richer setting would permit owners to update their beliefs over time, and for managers to establish reputations. Second, the model could also be generalized to include competition in both the labor and product markets.
As shown by Grenadier (2002) , the forces of competition greatly alter the investment behavior implied by real options models.
Appendices
A Solution to the Optimal Contracting Problem
This appendix provides a derivation of the optimal contracts detailed in Section 3.
We proceed by first proving Lemma 3. Then, we present the simplified optimization problem and derive the optimal contract in the three critical regions.
The owner's objective is to maximize the value of his option, as expressed in (2.13).
As discussed in Section 2.3, this optimization is subject to the ex-ante and ex-post incentive constraints (2.14), (2.15), (2.16), (2.17) and (2.18). Lemmas 1 and 2 allow us to simplify the problem as follows:
Using the method of Kuhn-Tucker, we form the Lagrangian as follows:
with corresponding complementary slackness conditions for the four constraints. The first-order condition with respect to w 1 implies:
The first-order condition with respect to w 2 implies:
Using (A.7) to simplify (A.8),
Therefore, the complementary slackness condition λ 4 (w 2 −θ 2 ) = 0 implies that w 2 = θ 2 .
This proves Lemma 3.
Using Lemmas 1, 2 and 3, we can now write the simplified problem as:
The first-order conditions with respect to P 1 and P 2 imply:
We conjecture that the ex-post IC constraint for the type-θ 2 manager, (A.12), does not bind, in that λ 2 = 0, for all three regions that we analyze. We will verify this conjecture for each region. By combining the conjecture that λ 2 = 0 with Lemma 3,
we have that P 1 = P * 1 and w 2 = θ 2 in each of the relevant contract regions. With λ 2 = 0, then (A.7) may be written as λ 1 + λ 3 = 1. Therefore, it must be the case that at least one of (A.11) and (A.13) binds. This is consistent with our intuition.
Otherwise, lowering w 1 increases the expected surplus to the owner, without violating any other constraints.
A.1 The Joint Hidden Information-Hidden Action Region:
We derive the optimal contract in this region by conjecturing that both (A.11) and (A.13) bind. Solving these two equality constraints gives us:
The solution for P 2 implies that λ 1 can be written as:
The only possible regions under which both constraints may bind 19 is characterized by
The above argument implies that the only possible region under which both constraints hold must lie within (A.18). But it does not necessarily imply that all the region will require that both constraints bind. However, we now show that both (A.11) and (A.13) bind throughout this entire region. The region characterized by (A.18) can be equivalently expressed as P * 2 < K 2 < K H . Because (A.17) implies that λ 1 is monotonic increasing in K 2 , therefore, the Lagrangian multiplier is characterized by 0 < λ 1 < 1, in this region. Since λ 3 = 1 − λ 1 , we also have 0 < λ 3 < 1. Therefore, by the complementary slackness conditions, both (A.11) and (A.13) bind in this joint region, confirming the result that (A.18 is the whole region, with both constraints binding.
A.2 The Hidden Information Region:
Suppose that the ex-ante IC constraint (A.13) does not bind. Since (A.11) must hold as an equality, and since λ 1 = 1, we therefore have A.3 The Hidden Action Region:
Suppose that (A.11) does not bind and (A.13) binds, then λ 1 = 0 by complementary slackness, and λ 3 = 1. Therefore,
We need to verify that (A.11) and (A.12) do not bind. If the parameters do not fall in any of the three regions, namely,
then it can be shown that the owner will not choose to motivate the manager to exert effort. The cost of effort is so high as to overwhelm any potential benefits of motivating effort. A proof of this result is available from the authors upon request.
B Solution to the Generalized Optimal Contracting Problem in Section 5
This appendix provides a derivation of the optimal contract detailed in Section 5. Since Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 apply as in the standard model, the owner solves the following optimization problem:
with corresponding complementary slackness conditions for the four constraints.The first-order condition with respect to w 1 implies:
Using (B.7) to simplify (B.8),
The complementary slackness condition implies that w 2 = θ 2 . This proves Lemma 3 for the generalized model.
Therefore, we may simplify the optimization problem as follows:
The first-order condition with respect to P 1 is given by
14)
The first-order condition with respect to P 2 is given by
Also note that
We conjecture that the ex-post IC constraint for the type-θ 2 manager, (B.12), does not bind, in that λ 2 = 0, for all three regions that we analyze. We will verify this conjecture for each region. With λ 2 = 0, then (B.16) may be written as
Therefore, it must be the case that at least one of (B.11) and (B.13) binds. This is consistent with our intuition. Otherwise, lowering w 1 increases the expected surplus to the manager, without violating any other constraints.
B.1 The Hidden Information Region:
Suppose that the third constraint (B.13) does not bind and thus λ 3 = 0. Then,
A binding ex-ante IC constraint (B.11) implies that the wage payment is
Using the first-order conditions (B.14) and (B.15), the optimal trigger levels are
(B.20)
Note that with γ > β, we immediately have P 1 < P * 1 and P 2 > P * 2 . Therefore, w 1 < θ 2 , as conjectured, confirming that (B.12) does not bind. Therefore, for the region defined by ξ ∆q < P K H γ ∆θ, the optimal contract can be written as: In order to confirm that both the first and third constraints bind, we require that We now consider λ 1 as a function ofK 2 , and rewrite (B.40) as:
(B.41)
Note that from (B.38),K 1 is a function ofK 2 ; we make this functional dependence explicit in the above equation. We thus need to show that L(x) > 0 for x ∈ (P * 2 ,K H ). Using implicit differentiation in (B.38), we can write:
(B.44) becauseK 1 (x) < P * 1 in this region. Therefore,
From (B.44),
< 0, (B.46) becauseK 1 (x) < P * 1 in this region. Therefore,
dL(x) dx
< 0 for x ∈ (P * 2 ,K H ). Since L(K H ) = 0, we thus have L(x) > 0 for x ∈ (P * 2 ,K H ). This confirms that λ 1 , λ 3 > 0 in this entire region, and therefore both (B.11) and (B.13) bind.
Therefore, for the region defined by
∆θ, the optimal contract can be written as: 
